DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF EVALUATIONS IN SELECTED SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA)

Graduate School of Public and Development Management,

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

**Drafting team**: Stephen Porter and Osvaldo Feinstein (CLEAR-AA/Wits)

**Management Team**: Stephen Porter, Osvaldo Feinstein, Salim Latib, Anne McLennan, David Rider Smith

**Reference Group**: Michael Bamberger, Derek Poate, Zenda Ofir, Robert Picciotto, Nidhi Khattri, Howard White, Jessica Kitakule-Mukungu, Ian Goldman

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Executive Summary

This study argues that the political economy of a country conditions the opportunities for evaluation to be used in policy processes. Consequently, evaluation capacity development practices need to be undertaken in a manner that works towards development with the prevailing political economy. Political economy issues become less evident as analysis moves from the policy space towards technical delivery, but still impacts upon the way evaluation processes unfold.

This argument has been developed through synthesising findings from the case studies in five African countries; namely, Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. These studies mapped evaluation demand and supply with consideration for the political economy. In undertaking the mapping, this study found that there is potential rather than actual technical capacity to manage, undertake and demand evaluations. This is a major constraint on the use of evaluation. High-quality evaluations are more often commissioned and managed by development partners than government, which means that they are less likely to be used in policy. There are, however, some notable examples development partner led evaluations being used. In some cases universities, think tanks and civil society actors in the country have some good technical capacity and can navigate the political context in a manner that promotes development rather than self-interest. Such technically good and politically savvy evaluation actors offer entry points to evaluation capacity development efforts.

Background

In Africa there is now evidence of emerging country-led demands for evaluation (Porter and Goldman 2013), consistent with the general emphasis of the Paris Declaration on the use of country owned systems. However, understanding of how to identify and connect evaluation supply to these demands remains limited. Often analyses have not considered a full range of opportunities, and have instead focused exclusively on technical strengthening of executive functions for evaluation or areas where monitoring information can more easily be generated. A framework has been developed from the findings of the five case studies which supports the application of a political economy analysis going forward. This framework, in alignment with the overall aims of the study, helps to understand in case countries:

(i) The conditions under which demand is generated for evidence; and
(ii) the areas in which supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand.

The Regional Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA) coordinated these mapping studies. Researchers within the countries and from CLEAR-AA worked together to complete the studies with inputs from an overall reference group. The study was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which also provided guidance.

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1 Full versions of the case studies can be found: [http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/](http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/)
2 CLEAR-AA is based at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. CLEAR-AA aims to enhance development anchored in learning, evaluation and results.
3 The team supporting this study were: Stephen Porter, Salim Latib, Osvaldo Feinstein and Anne McLennan from CLEAR-AA/Wits; and from the countries Mr. Oswick Mulenga (Zambia), Dr. Getnet Zewdu (Ethiopia), Mr Charles Gasana (Rwanda), Dr. Hannock Kumwenda (Malawi), Prof. Samuel Adams and Dr. Charles Amoatey (Ghana). The international panel of experts that provided comments at different critical moments of the work were: Michael Bamberger, Derek Poate, Zenda Olfir, Robert Picciotto, Nidhi
Overall Framework and Method

The five case studies mapped the opportunities and challenges for conducting evaluation amongst a variety of role-players. An analysis of the political economy of the countries frames the analysis. This study defines the political economy as the "social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of...[policy]" (Mosco 1996: 24). This definition calls attention to the forces and processes at work upon policy and implementation that affect evaluation. Applying the political economy analysis, two overarching configurations were identified amongst the five case countries: neo-patrimonial (Ghana, Malawi, Zambia) and developmental patrimonial (Ethiopia, Rwanda). In should be noted that all case countries also include elements of both of these configurations as well as liberal democratic incentives. The categorisation into different configurations enables us to broadly identify different entry points to improving evaluation practice. More detailed studies could be undertaken within specific sectors.

The development of the overall framework and methods for the study drew upon initial inception work undertaken by DFID. This initial inception work also identified the case countries for the study against set criteria.\(^5\)

**National evaluation capacity** is defined according to a conceptual scheme of the ‘principals’ and ‘agents’ involved in the study. Table 1 presents the specific stakeholders considered under the headings of principals and agents. This conceptual scheme recognises that there is a multitude of actual and potential actors who can supply and demand evaluation. Government agents can manage conduct and use evaluations.

**Table 1: Principals and Agents Studied**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Government Agents</th>
<th>Evaluation Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Line ministries</td>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation associations and networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principals are generally the demand-side of evaluation. Government agents work with supply through commissioning evaluations, although they can demand evaluations. Although those managing evaluation have a partiality towards demand, good evaluation managers need to understand the conduct of evaluations. Evaluation agents are generally the supply-side.

Kumwenda (Malawi), Prof. Samuel Adams and Dr. Charles Amoatey (Ghana). The international panel of experts that provided comments at different critical moments of the work were: Michael Bamberger, Derek Poate, Zenda Ofir, Robert Picciotto, Nidhi Khattri, Howard White, Jessica Kitakule-Mukungu, Ian Goldman

\(^4\) Specifically David Rider Smith who commissioned this study

\(^5\) The terms of reference for this study, which includes the original concept note and the country prioritisation matrix can be found at: [http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/](http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/)
The study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of existing evaluation/evaluative research products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of informants across critical stakeholder groupings. In total 77 agencies were interviewed as part of this study.

The National Evaluation Capacity conceptual framework supported the collection, collation and analysis of relevant information. In keeping with this, the study methodology encompassed the following overlapping stages: i) establishing study commitment and support from key stakeholders; ii) collating and analysing primary and secondary data and information of the evaluation system (including available academic and popular literature); iii) conducting a series of interviews with actors that fall within the space established through the broad conceptual map; iv) producing a draft paper. Each of these stages is discussed in more details in Annex 3.

Findings

The key finding that emerges from this study is that the political economy conditions policy processes, within which evaluation supply and demand interact. It is argued that many demand and supply-side concerns are technical, yet because the overall policy space is political, rapid reviews of the political economy can help to highlight potential entry points for evaluation capacity development. Table 2 presents the findings in accordance with the political economy issues to aid the identification of evaluation capacity development activities.

Neopatrimonial and developmental patrimonial political logics offer variable entry points for evaluation. In states that have many elements of neopatrimonial behaviour it is difficult understand how informal forces will work in shaping policy processes, either decision-making or implementation. This means that policy processes can be captured. However, the existence of multiple competing interests does mean that there are multiple entry points for capacity development as well as potential users of evaluative evidence.

In states that have many developmental patrimonial elements policy-making is centralised. This makes policy influence directly through evidence difficult as elites defines policy. However, as the state is legitimised through delivery of development, there is openness within technocratic state structures to evidence to inform implementation strategy. The below table lacks the nuance that is brought out in the individual country cases, but it does provide rules of thumb around challenges and opportunities for evaluation use in different political settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall structure of the state</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to central policy making structures. There is a centralised patronage structure that allows for strategic resource allocations.</td>
<td>Actual policy change is difficult to achieve, but interest groups can use evidence to their advantage to access resources</td>
<td>Loyalty is aligned to elite interests rather that performance (although the two can overlap)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental Patrimonial</td>
<td>Neopatrimonial</td>
<td>Commonalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence on implementation is possible.</td>
<td>Neopatrimonial states have weaker central ministries and technocratic controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development partners have limited input into policy decisions.</td>
<td>Expenditure is mediated through informal processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning budgeting and M&amp;E systems</strong></td>
<td>Sector working groups rarely represent genuine country-led planning forums</td>
<td>Demand for evaluation is latent or potential in the executive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental patrimonial states are less open to debate, but have in place strong technocratic central ministries to oversee implementation.</td>
<td>National development plans are only partial statement of intent</td>
<td>There is a monitoring focus in the executive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and expenditure are broadly linked.</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is a general Interest in specialised units placed in the executive supporting evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector working groups are functional</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited staff in parliament to support research processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National development plans are statements of intent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Entry points for evaluation in civil society could be identified amongst older civil society actors that have developed their political legitimacy across different actors over time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principals</strong></td>
<td>Public accounts committee has limited ability to affect change based on audit reports</td>
<td>Development partners dominate actual implementation of evaluation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some demand for research</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development partner-led evaluation can complement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Developmental Patrimonial |
| Neopatrimonial |
| Commonalities |
| local demands. |

**Government agents**
- Strong central ministries offer a focal point for ECD
- Need to identify champions in both central and in line ministries (e.g. health)
- Limited budgets for evaluation in government
- Limited capacity to manage evaluations in government

**Evaluation agents’ capacity and links to demand**
- Trade-offs need to be managed in increasing the capacity of the University sector
- Some quality university expertise in economics, health and agriculture. That is legitimate to the political economy.
- Emerging number of think tanks with policy relevance
- Lack of embedded networks of evaluators that link to policy processes

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**Conclusion**

In completing the country studies it became clear that theories of change for evaluation capacity development should emphasise the importance of the context, particularly the political economy. The political economy conditions how policy processes unfold, this in turn affects the demand and supply of evaluation and their interaction, which enables or disables the use of evaluation. This chain is represented thus:

Political Economy → Demand & Supply of evaluation → Use of evaluation

This suggests that when there is an active demand for evaluation, and evaluation supply, that works within the conditions of the political economy, evaluations will be conducted and used.

It has been suggested that development partner influence can curtail the usefulness of evaluation. However, in Rwanda, which has strong ownership of its policies, this is a non-issue. In other countries, such as Zambia, the usefulness of evaluations would depend on the entry point(s). There are two possible responses to this. One is to suggest that there is no point investing in evaluation capacity development in countries lacking an enabling environment. Another is to use a political economy analysis to take identify appropriate entry points for evaluation.

The case studies show that in all countries there are opportunities to strengthen technical evaluation supply, with governments playing a more active role in demanding and managing evaluations. Think tanks and universities may enhance their capacities to conduct evaluations within research processes, whereas donors can provide
opportunities for learning by doing through support within sector-working groups that are country-led. Furthermore, sharing evaluation experiences among sub-Saharan African countries can strengthen local and regional evaluation networks, contributing to the development of regional evaluation capacities and to fostering demand for evaluation, making policymakers aware of the knowledge generated by evaluation and the possibilities of using that knowledge to improve policy making. A challenge remains to work with these opportunities within a given political economy.
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1 Introduction

1) In Africa there is now evidence of emerging country-led demands for evaluation (Porter and Goldman 2013), consistent with the general emphasis of the Paris Declaration on the use of country owned systems. However, understanding of how to identify and connect evaluation supply to these demands remains limited. Often analyses have not considered a full range of opportunities, and have instead focused exclusively on technical strengthening of executive functions for evaluation or areas where monitoring information can more easily be generated. This report argues that as politics determines how resources are distributed in the state through policy processes; this in turn affects the entry points for the use of evidence in policy. Consequently a political economy analysis is useful to help define evaluation capacity development (ECD) interventions. A framework is developed to support the application of a political economy analysis. The framework raises issues that are common to certain political economy configurations and could potentially help adaptation of ECD responses by framing questions and acting as a rule of thumb, rather than being predictive. In introducing the framework this study helps to understand in case countries:

(iii) The conditions under which demand is generated for evidence; and

(iv) the areas in which supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand.

2) The proposed framework has been developed through synthesising findings from the case studies in five African countries; namely, Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. These studies mapped the opportunities and challenges for conducting evaluation amongst a variety of role-players. The Regional Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA) coordinated these mapping studies. Researchers within the countries and from CLEAR-AA worked together to complete the studies with inputs from an overall reference group. The study was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which also provided guidance.

3) It should be noted that this study sought neither to conduct an evaluation of ECD nor a meta-evaluation. Instead this study maps the demand and supply for evaluation and the political economy in which it unfolds. Consequently, this report passes no judgement on existing capacity development efforts. Rather the report puts forward an analysis and a framework that can inform future diagnostic work and the design of ECD activities. This framework is based upon previous work undertaken on identifying national evaluation capacities (Feinstein 2011; Porter and Goldman 2013) that fed into the inception of this study and political economy issues that arose during the literature review and field work (For example, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Fosu 2013; Leenstra 2012; Leiderer and Faust 2012). It should be noted that the evidence

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6 CLEAR-AA is based at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. CLEAR-AA aims to enhance development anchored in learning, evaluation and results.

7 The team supporting this study were: Stephen Porter, Salim Latib, Osvaldo Feinstein and Anne McLennan from CLEAR-AA/Wits; and from the countries Mr. Osward Mulenga (Zambia), Dr. Getnet Zewdu (Ethiopia), Mr Charles Gasana (Rwanda), Dr. Hannock Kumwenda (Malawi), Prof. Samuel Adams and Dr. Charles Amoatey (Ghana). In addition, a panel of international experts provided comments at different critical moments of the work.

8 Specifically David Rider Smith who commissioned this study.
gathered for this study is not completely consistent, due to the diversity of the information systems and practices in the five sub-Saharan countries.

4) The questions that guided this study are:

On the demand side,

i. What has been the actual demand for evaluation from principals? Where is there latent and potential demand for evaluation?

ii. How is evaluation demanded in the current organisational arrangements?

On the supply side and on matching evaluation supply and demand,

iii. What is the range and capacity of entities supplying evaluation services? How relevant are the managers and producers of evaluation to the actual demand for evaluation? Where can evaluation supply (actual, latent and potential) be strengthened so that it meets and fosters demand?

5) This study builds upon previous work facilitated by CLEAR-AA on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems across six African countries, undertaken in partnership with the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in the South African Presidency.

6) The following sections are presented in this study: First, the framework that guided the research; second, the approach and methodology used; third, the political economy context of the countries; fourth, a mapping of evaluation demand and supply; fifth, a framework to assist future diagnostic work; finally, the last section offers some concluding comments.

2 Overall Framework

7) This section presents the overall conceptual framework applied in the study and the theory of change applied, including: the definition of political economy; a definition of evaluation; a conceptual framework to analyse the national evaluation system; and the definition of evaluation demand and supply.

2.1 Political Economy

8) Framing the study of the national evaluation system within this report is an analysis of the political economy of the countries. This study defines the political economy as the “social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of...[policy]” (Mosco 1996: 24). This calls attention to the forces and processes at work upon policy and implementation that affect evaluation.

9) The states studied fell into two broad political economy patterns: neopatrimonial and developmental patrimonial. Although the details in each country are nuanced and specific these overall headings provide useful lenses for analysis of ECD opportunities.

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9 At http://tinyurl.com/ac7ng7w.
Succinct definitions for these political economy patterns of resource allocation are drawn from the Africa Power and Politics Programme of the Overseas Development Institute. A state with neopatrimonial characteristics:

“On the one hand...is a formal administrative structure governed by rules and underpinned by law. On the other hand, much of the actual operation of public affairs is dictated by a different set of principles. State resources bureaucratic positions, and the power to allocate rents, provide services, and determine policies and their beneficiaries are captured by personal or private networks in the hands of dominant patrons. Thus, instead of being governed by explicit objectives and legal rules, it is effectively an apparatus serving the interests of the particular groups and individuals that have captured it.” (Booth et al. 2005)

10) Based upon primary and secondary evidence gathered in the country studies Ghana, Malawi and Zambia are characterised in this study as neopatrimonial in their policy processes. Although in Ghana there is evidence of pluralistic democratic structures becoming more substantial in policy.

11) Neopatrimonial logic in the behaviour of the state can still mean that development is achieved. The achievement of development is, however, tempered by interests aligning with development objectives. This means that a policy structure or process can become ordered or disordered so as to enable personal, group, or institutional benefit to be derived. Disorder such as poor record keeping and information management can represent a strategy to avoid accountability, rather than a lack of capacity. Similarly, order, such as a public service reform programme, can provide an opportunity for consolidating power, diverting and accumulating resources. On a large enough scale these behaviours become ways that groups act. The consequence of this is that policy becomes difficult to actually change as interests mediate implementation. Group interests assert control over reform to better achieve their objectives. Some of these nuances around policy implementation are brought out in discussions on specific countries in the next section.

12) Developmental patrimonialism, in contrast, is defined as:

“When the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralised way with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in the long run rather than maximising them in the short run.” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012)

13) The current ruling elites in Ethiopia and Rwanda both came to power through crisis and conflict. In Ethiopia the ruling party overthrew the Dergue regime, in Rwanda through the Genocide. In both countries the political establishment has sought to maintain power by building support through demonstrating an ability to provide development, while subordinating democratic processes. In this process rents have been centralised, often through companies that relate to the party (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). This option for maintaining power has been selected over and above using state resources to distribute rents to a broad network or through outright suppression. Policy in these countries is developed with the view that economic and social development helps to ameliorate divisions of the past (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). As a result, undermining policy challenges the overall developmental vision of ruling party, which is embedded within the state (Akinyemi 2013). This makes criticism of policy not just about contesting a decision-process, but about a challenge to the development vision of the elite. This strategy reduces the role of development partners in policy. If the
ruling elite view a defined policy change as helping to achieve development in a manner that reinforces their control they pursue the allocation of resources to that objective.

2.2 Evaluation

14) Evaluation is defined in accordance with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (2002), as:

“The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or program.”

2.2.1 Conceptual Framework for National Evaluation Capacities

15) The National Evaluation Capacity (NEC) matrix in Table 3 provides a conceptual map of the ‘principals’ and ‘agents’ involved in the study. This conceptual scheme recognises that there is a multitude of actual and potential actors who can supply and demand evaluation. Capacity in this scheme refers to individual, organisational and systems capacity. So, for example, in managing evaluations what is required are not only individuals, but also incentive structures to support evaluation.

Table 3: National Evaluation Capacity Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Practice Requiring Capacity</th>
<th>Government Agents (Central and line departments)</th>
<th>Evaluation Actors (Universities, think tanks, consultants)</th>
<th>Principals (Cabinet, Parliament, political parties, civil society, the media)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing Evaluations (interface between supply and demand)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting evaluations (Supply side)</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using Evaluations (Demand side)</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16) The roman numerals in the national evaluation capacity matrix are used to facilitate reference to the matrix’s cells. Thus, I is government’s capacity to manage evaluations; IV is government’s capacity to conduct evaluations, and so on. This matrix\textsuperscript{10} allows consideration of different actual and possible scenarios.

\textsuperscript{10} Adapted from Feinstein (2011)
17) Within this matrix there are three main groups of actors in a national evaluation system: principals, government agents, and evaluation agents. Each of these groups interact with the political economy, play roles in policy processes, and can demand and supply evaluation.

18) *Principals*, play a leading role in the direction of the state through defining the parameters of the political economy and policy processes. In the main principals demand evaluation (although they can manage and conduct evaluations). The challenge for principals is that they need to manage agents who implement policy. Principals may have positional power, but they have limited levers of control. As a result evaluation can be important to them as it provides information on implementation. In demanding evaluation not only do principals have challenges overseeing government and evaluation agents, but because of asymmetries of information, they often do not know what these agents are meant to be doing (Stiglitz 2002). This framework differentiates between three different principals: Political leaders (executive and legislature), civil society, and development partners.

19) *Government Agents* are entrusted “to act on behalf of those they are supposed to be serving” (Stiglitz 2002: 523). In doing this they manage institutions and policy processes. Often government agents need to weigh input from different principals both inside and outside the state. They are able to develop knowledge on institutions and policy that allows them to influence implementation. From an evaluation perspective this means that they can intercede in demands for evaluation. This report focuses on the role of senior policy and implementation public servants in central and line agencies. These are individuals who are directly involved in shaping plans and implementation strategies.

20) *Evaluation Agents* undertake evaluations. Similar to government agents evaluation agents have more knowledge than other role-players in their area of expertise. Where incentives and regulation are weak a lower standard of service might become the norm. By working together they may seek to develop learning, sharing and voluntary regulation mechanisms to improve practice. This study analysed three main sub-sets of agents: think tanks, evaluation associations, and academic institutions.

21) It is recognised that the above categorisation could be expanded. It is also acknowledged that in some contexts principals become agents and vice versa. The current list of principals and agents helps to produce a continuity of analysis across political, policy and evaluation interactions.

### 2.2.2 Evaluation Demand and Supply

22) Demand and supply in this study are defined in terms of the NEC framework above. Principals are generally the demand-side of evaluation. Government agents generally work with supply through commissioning evaluations, although they can demand evaluations. Although those managing evaluation have a partiality towards demand, good evaluation managers need to understand the conduct of evaluations. Evaluation agents are generally the supply-side. In alignment with the matrix above it is

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11 In this report evaluation associations include evaluation consultants. Evaluation consultants do undertake evaluations, however, beyond recognising them broadly as an entry point for conducting evaluations their capacities are not analysed in this study.

12 For an interesting discussion on the art of forming lists see Umberto Eco and Alastair Mcewen, *The Infinity of Lists* (Rizzoli, 2009).
recognised although these are their main roles they can on occasions perform other functions, for example, evaluators can become users of evaluations.

23) **Demand for evaluation**: When decision makers want to use evidence to assist them in making decisions an actual, latent or potential demand arises ("latent" if the decision maker is not aware that evaluation can be a source of evidence, "potential" if there is an awareness but resources to fund the evaluation are lacking\(^\text{13}\)). Amongst different principals and government agents the configuration of demand may be different. For example, the executive may focus on improving performance, while the legislature might be focused on accountability.\(^\text{14}\)

24) When demand for evaluation arises within a given country's political economy, as opposed to arising from structures external to the system, such as donors, there is increased ownership of the evaluation, a critical factor to ensure its use. This argument is elaborated in a variety of forms in evaluation and capacity development literature (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2003; Boyle and Lemarie 1999; Chelimsky 2006; Lopes and Theisohn 2003; Mackay 2007; Picciotto 1995; Plaatjies and Porter 2011;Pollitt et al. 2009; Toulemonde 1999; Vedung 2003; Wiesner 2011). In order to analyse demand there is a need to build an understanding of the overall political economy and the formal and informal influences that shape decision-making.

25) **Supply of evaluation**: Those who conduct evaluations are the supply-side. A supply-side capacity development approach typically focuses on putting in place people who are competent in collecting, capturing and verifying data; interacting with the system for commissioning, designing and disseminating credible evaluation; and in other broader capacities for generating evaluations. However, capacity development on the supply-side is insufficient to ensure evidence use. Credible data produced by technically sound people does not mean that it is relevant to the existing political context. The strength of evaluation supply is predicated on its ability to relate to demand through existing frameworks, institutions and resources for evaluation.

### 2.3 Theory of Change

26) At the outset of this study the following Theory of Change was proposed. The overall theory of change is revisited in the conclusion of this report to reflect the results and learning of the study. In particular, political economy factors are included as an endogenous element in the theory of change rather than an assumption.

27) The study assumes that a well-functioning evaluation system that supplies high quality evaluations\(^\text{15}\), responding to demand in accordance with the political economy and interacting with policy processes, is the outcome of evaluation capacity development. The assumptions implicit in this outcome statement are as follows:

- A policy process presents an opportunity to actualise potential and latent evaluation demand.

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\(^{13}\) For example, latent demand and potential demand may exist in a legislature where a faction of the ruling party wants to better understand why education is performing poorly. By introducing them to different evaluative methods that can help answer their questions they may demand evaluations.

\(^{14}\) For an elaboration of different types of evaluations used in Congress see Eleanor Chelimsky, 'The Purpose of Evaluation in a Democratic Society', in Ian Shaw, Jennifer C. Green, and Melvin M. Mark (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Evaluation (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006).

\(^{15}\) Taking into account Norm 8 of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Norms for Evaluation in the UN System".
• The political economy issues affect the demand for, and supply of, evaluation/evidence.
• There is sufficient actual evaluation supply in-country that can be mobilised for policy processes in accordance with the political economy.
• There are sources of potential and latent demand which need to be elicited in demand constrained environments.
• Supply can elicit potential and latent demand if it is relevant to principals.

28) The elements of a theory of change supporting movement towards the development of evaluation supply and demand can briefly be summarised as follows (in reference to the NEC matrix):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMAND FOR EVALUATION</th>
<th>SUPPLY OF EVALUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE1 Interest in evidence to inform policy processes (Principals, Government agents)</td>
<td>SE1 Capacity to conduct evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE2 Realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence (P, G)</td>
<td>1a Actual capacity (evaluation agents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE3 Availability of funds to contract evaluations (P, G)</td>
<td>1b Potential capacity (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE2 Capacity to manage evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2a Actual capacity (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2b Potential capacity (G)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elements of the theory of change can be stated as a process:

• If potential users of evaluation come to recognise that they can affect policy processes to their benefit through using evaluation, then they will demand evaluation (DE1, 2 and 3)
• If managers and conductors of evaluation have the capacity, political understanding and funds, then they respond to the demand from users (SE1 and SE2);
• If commissioning and use of evaluation becomes widespread, then virtuous cycles of evaluation capacity development take place, leading to more institutionalised evidence-based practice (DE & SE).

The overall theory of change (DE & SE \(\rightarrow\) Use of evaluation) is based on the hypothesis: When there is an active demand for evaluation, and evaluation supply, evaluations will be conducted and used.

3 Study Approach and Methodology

29) This study was both widely exploratory and substantively detailed in orientation. It was exploratory as it seeks to understand the incentives and opportunities that shape the nature of the supply of and demand for evaluation within the national context. It was detailed as it seeks to build a substantive explanation of evaluation use in regard to the political economy.
30) The development of the overall framework and methods for the study drew upon initial inception work undertaken by DFID. This initial inception work also identified the case countries for the study against set criteria.\(^\text{16}\)

31) The study had in the country cases two main units of analysis and/or exploration:

(i) **Mapping the national system** as it currently stands. This means mapping the demand for evaluation amongst principals, while also mapping the supply of evaluation in terms of government and evaluation agents.

(ii) **Examples of policy engagement** are illustrations made in boxes within the country cases. These are sector focused (e.g. child nutrition and child immunisation programmes within the health sector), policy areas, or are generic areas (i.e. budgeting reform, capacity building, results based reforms, planning interventions)

32) The study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of existing evaluation/evaluative research products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of informants across critical stakeholder groupings. In total 77 agencies were interviewed as part of this study.

33) The NEC matrix provided the framework for the collection, collation and analysis of relevant information. In keeping with this, the study methodology encompassed the following overlapping stages: i) establishing study commitment and support from key stakeholders; ii) collating and analysing primary and secondary data and information of the evaluation system (including available academic and popular literature); iii) conducting a series of interviews with actors that fall within the space established through the broad conceptual map; iv) producing a draft paper. Each of these stages is discussed in Annex 3.

4 **Political Economy of Case Countries**

34) This section outlines overall issues that need to be taken into account in understanding the conditions in which evaluation operates, in the different political economy settings. It should be noted that all countries political economy is nuanced. All countries display elements that are both developmental patrimonial and neopatrimonial. In addition all countries did have some elements of liberal democratic incentives. The analysis here is focused on the characteristics that are prevalent rather than those that are evident in only some areas of the state.

35) In developmental patrimonial states (Rwanda and Ethiopia) there are four overall political economy issues that need to be taken into consideration when conducting evaluation: (i) policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to central policy making structures; (ii) the centralised patronage structure allows for strategic resource allocations to policy priorities; (iii) influence on implementation through evaluation is possible where it furthers the agenda of the elite; (iv)

\(^{16}\) The terms of reference for this study, which includes the original concept note and the country prioritisation matrix can be found at: [http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/](http://www.clear-aa.co.za/publications/)
development partners have limited input into policy decisions and are restricted by assertions of sovereignty.

36) In the developmental patrimonial states in this study, policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to central policy making structures. Central policy making structures are often embedded within small elites (perhaps a sub-set of a party) bound together through a common history. For example, in Ethiopia the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has dominated the country’s political landscape since taking power in 1991. Although the Constitution is premised on a strategy of devolution to regions, the dominance of the ruling coalition, under the EPRDF, underpins strong uniformity in the overall governance system (Smith, 2013). This means that unless the central policy making elite within the party see evidence as valuable it will not be used in policy or implementation. The Rwanda case notes a similar dominance of a single party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

37) Centralised patronage structures allow for strategic resource allocations to policy shifts. For example, in Rwanda the centralisation of power has created a strong culture of upward accountability that enables the state to set priorities that are followed (Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; Reytjens 2011). This means that the development plans in Vision 2020 and Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies are real and implemented. If new policy areas are identified, even within constraints resources can be allocated to the new priority.

38) Influence on implementation in developmental patrimonial states through evaluation is possible where it furthers the agenda of the elite. Box 1 contains an example of where evaluation work coincided with issues recognised by the elite.

Box 1: Evaluation feeding into Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian public health sector is characterised by low coverage rates, low utilisation rates and the country experiences low health outcomes, particularly in rural areas. In the last decade, the Ministry of Health policy responses to underutilisation of health care in Ethiopia has focused on supply side problems, and has given priority to the development of health services extension programmes and the rapid expansion of health posts and health centres. Despite the huge efforts on the supply side and the high burden of disease, health services utilisation remained low for many years. This was noted in the periodic demographic and health surveys of the Central Statistics Agency and administrative data from the Ministry itself.

The Ministry of Health undertook an evaluation with the help of USAID in 1995 and recognised that demand side barriers such as poverty and the cost of health care have contributed to underutilisation of health care services. Based on this evaluation, it established a new health policy in 1995/96, which highlights the importance of health care financing reforms for better health service delivery and health insurance to increase the health care utilisation level and reduce the high disease burden. The Ministry set up a task force to lead the process of the policy change. This task force was headed by the then Planning and Policy Department of the Ministry and composed of various stakeholders such as Abt Associates, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Social

17 Abt Associates is a private consulting firm and implementing wing of the Health Care Financing Reform Strategy and Health Insurance Strategy in Ethiopia.
and Labour Affairs, Association of Private Health Practitioners, and four Regional Health Bureaus.

This task force, accountable to the Ministry of Health, visited Mexico, Ghana, Senegal and Rwanda in 2006 and 2007 to look into the international experience in health insurance. The task force presented its report and findings to the high level forum chaired by the Minister in 2007. This extensive study and learning process led to the development of the Health Insurance Strategy (HIS) in 2008. The strategy was inclusive of Social Health Insurance (SHI) for the formal sector and a Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme in rural areas to be rolled out on a pilot basis, with the aim of scaling up nationwide.

Abt Associates in 2008 produced a document on Piloting Community-Based Health Insurance in Ethiopia: The Way Forward and commissioned several feasibility studies on CBHI in four regions - Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray. Based on these studies, the government launched the CBHI in the four regional states in 2011. In each region, three pilot districts were selected. These districts were chosen on the basis of the willingness of district authorities to implement and support CBHI, geographical accessibility of health centres, quality of health services and management information systems, implementation of cost recovery and local revenue retention (Abt Associates, 2008).

The CBHI project has an inbuilt M&E component in order to assess the pilot implementation and draw lessons for the scale-up. There is also a collaborative research project investigating the impact of CBHI. This research project involved a baseline survey before the implementation of the CBHI in March-April 2011 and has completed a two follow up surveys with the same households, in the same months, in 2012 and 2013. Interim results are positive. The process that unfolded from the focus on supply side towards a demand side demonstrates that there are spaces for policy shift when government is faced with data and that this often serves to catalyse actions directed at generating further evidence and policy guidance.

39) In developmental patrimonial states development partners have limited input into policy decisions and are restricted by assertions of sovereignty, though they can still influence implementation. For example, in Rwanda within this study, three scenarios emerged around how government may respond to development partner led efforts: allow, embrace, dismiss. Evaluative activities are allowed if they do not conflict with any politically sensitive elements, if they support the political goals of the Government or do not require large-scale surveys without political support. For example, randomised control trials (RCT) have been completed or are on-going in relation to performance financing in health (Basinga et al. 2011) and in agricultural production (J-PAL 2013). These evaluations were carried-out with funding from development partners and led by investigators external to the country, but operate in safe political spaces where the executive has an interest in evidence to improve implementation strategies. An evaluative activity may well be embraced if it is likely to reinforce a success or gives useful descriptive information about progress. For example, the regular household surveys (which are funded by Development Partners) are an information source that is embraced in high-level leadership retreats. Finally, if a development partner finances an evaluative activity in a sensitive area, then the process may face issues. For example, it was reported that a development partner project that had inappropriately introduced critiques of land issues had found it difficult to gain the necessary approvals to conduct research.

40) In neopatrimonial states in contrast, actual policy change is difficult to achieve, but interest groups can use evidence to their advantage to access resources. The
opportunities for ECD in neopatrimonial states reside in interests that seek poverty reduction and development beyond their constituencies in order to shift implementation. For example, as Leenstra (2012: 302) argues in relation to donor interventions in Zambia, the results of interactions can: “never be planned or foreseen: the arena is complex, made up of competing and conflicting interests, and what is articulated is never a complete and accurate representation of real interests.” This means that evaluation processes need to be cognisant of informal policy spaces. In some sectors this can be achieved through working with development partners who control the budget allocation (e.g. health). In others an alliance of interests may be required.

41) Box 2 illustrates how difficult policy is to change once interest groups start to mediate implementation in a neopatrimonial environment.

Box 2: Neopatrimonial policy and evidence entry points: Subsidies in Zambia

The current national debate on maize subsidies in Zambia highlights tensions that arise when change challenges vested interest groups.

The President sparked a national debate when he proscribed a change in the subsidies regime (widely reported as subsidies removal). The President argued that the money could be better spent on infrastructure development.

There are three main Farming subsidies in Zambia. The first is the Food Reserves Agency (FRA), which purchases maize from farmers. The second is the farmer input support programme (FISP), which provides targeted households with fertilizer. The third are subsidies to millers of maize aimed to help control the price of maize. Together these three programmes account for 80% of government spending on agriculture and suffer regular and very large overruns, as reported by the President:

...during 2012, the budget allocation for the FISP was K500 billion against actual expenditure of K1.181 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K681.2 billion; while during the year 2011, K485 billion was budgeted against actual expenditure of K1,354.70 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K869.7 billion....In addition, during 2010, K100 billion was budgeted under the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) maize marketing programme against actual expenditure of K2.6 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K2.5 trillion; while in 2011, K150 billion was budgeted against actual expenditure of K3.2 trillion representing a budget overrun of K3.0 trillion.

These subsidies operate to achieve multiple objectives. Ostensibly, the aim of these interventions is to provide cheaper food and reduce poverty in rural areas, but actual benefits accrue to privileged groups (Mason et al. 2013). Mason and Myers (2013: 203) show that that the FRA’s intervention in maize

“...raised mean prices between July 2003 and December 2008 by 17–19%...which assisted surplus maize producers but adversely affected net buyers of maize in Zambia, namely urban consumers and the majority of the rural poor”.

Research on FISP has found very little evidence of poverty reduction through the maize subsidies (Mason et al. 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2013). In investigating the net impact of the scheme on food prices, Ricker-Gilbert found that doubling the size of the input scheme

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18 http://www.times.co.zm/?p=10777
would have limited effect on maize prices by reducing them by a maximum of 1.6%. R by the same group (Mason et al. 2013: v) found that the FISP was “being disproportionately allocated to better-off households above the $1.25/day poverty line.” Further, prior to 2011 constituencies won by the MMD received “significantly more subsidized fertilizer than those in areas lost by the ruling party”. The Media, Auditor General and civil society investigations into the allocation of FISP have confirmed challenges in its targeting. Finally, subsidies to millers have not been passed onto consumers in the form of cheaper maize meal from larger millers. Instead the informal sector has been able to process maize meal at lower costs leading to a reduction in price, though large millers are able to negate competition through the subsidy.

Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) is opposing the reduction in subsidies claiming that it is critical to smallholder farmers. The Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) has claimed that hunger will increase with a change in subsidy, arguing that “providing support to poor rural farmers in form of agricultural inputs is not a subsidy but a mandatory responsibility on the part of Government.”

Against this background, where the benefits of subsidies consistently accrue to those who are better off rather than the poor, government has been attempting to reform maize subsidies. However, after pressure according to media reports there has been limited change in the implementation of the subsidies regime.

What this case illustrates is the gap between formal policy intent (poverty reduction) and actual implementation (rents accruing to more powerful interests) and the complex array of interests mobilised around a policy shift. This means actual policy implementation is difficult to predict given that actual interests are only being partially articulated publically. Those who gain through large budget overspends on the programme may use the language of poverty reduction to defend their interests.

42) Similar patterns exist in Malawi and Ghana. For example, in Malawi the gap between policy and implementation is rooted in deep patterns of patronage (Booth et al 2006). Key initiatives are often adopted without any serious consideration of their viability and personality politics tend to prevent coordination. While in Ghana recent research points to neopatrimonial behaviour in areas, such as, in Policing (Tankebe 2013) and Logging (Teye 2013). Yet, arguably Ghana has been moving progressively out of a neopatrimonial mode of implementation toward greater democratic accountability.

43) A key difference to draw out of the above discussion is how rents are allocated. In a neopatrimonial state they are diffuse, networked, and short run, whereas in developmental patrimonial states they are centralised and long run leading. In the neopatrimonial setting loyalty is demanded to the objectives of vested interest groups. In a developmental patrimonial setting loyalty is to a single elite group and their agenda. Table 4 summarises the specificities and commonalities between the different overarching political economy considerations that arose during this study.

Table 4: Political economy findings

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19 http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/features/19918
20 http://allafrica.com/stories/201307151916.html?viewall=1
21 http://www.zambianintelligencenews.com/2013/06/03/maize-production-may-go-down-and-hunger-increase-znfu/
22 http://allafrica.com/stories/201306090074.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall structure of the state</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to central policy making structures. Centralised patronage structure that allows for strategic resource allocations. Influence on implementation is possible. Development partners have limited input into policy decisions.</td>
<td>Actual policy change is difficult to achieve, but interest groups can use evidence to their advantage to access resources</td>
<td>Loyalty is aligned to elite interests rather than performance (although the two can overlap)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Planning, budgeting and M&E frameworks

44) The planning, budgeting and M&E frameworks of the countries broadly reflect the political economy of the countries. Developmental patrimonial states are less open to debate, but have strong technocratic central ministries to oversee implementation, budget is broadly linked to execution, sector working groups are often functional and aligned to country-led interests, national development plans are statements of intent. Neopatrimonial states with diffused rent seeking have weaker central ministries and technocratic controls, which enable interests to mediate budget execution, national development plans are only a partial reflection of actual intent, and sector advisory groups do not function.

45) The relative power of central ministries in developmental patrimonial states contrasts markedly with neopatrimonial states. In Ethiopia, the country study identifies the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development as the overarching department in government with the authority and position to facilitate the link between the demand for and supply of evaluation. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development has been supported to improve its technocratic core through a reform programme that has been implemented since 2002 (the Expenditure Control Management Programme (EMCP) and the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP)). Reforms under the EMCP have concentrated on: (i) strengthening of Public Finance Management systems and processes, including medium-term programme-based budgeting; (ii) budget execution; (iii) internal controls and audit; (iii) cash management; (v) accounts reforms and; (vi) computerised financial management information system (IBEX).

46) The importance of national development plans in developmental patrimonial states is demonstrated by their efforts to actually align planning, budgeting and measurement processes. In Rwanda this has been an ongoing process. Currently all budget resources are prioritised using the MTEF approach and this has allowed for national plans, sector strategic plans and district development plans to be aligned with the medium term outlook and the national development strategy.

47) Both the Rwandan and Ethiopian studies note that sector-working groups are real and relevant bodies for decision-making. In Rwanda, for example, development partners reported that they use these forums to discuss strategy issues with the government. Within the Rwandan National Development Plan the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy envisions thematic working groups and sector working
groups to be the main commissioners and managers of evaluation in which the Ministry of Finance takes a leading role.

**Box 3: Accountability and Performance Measures in Developmental Patrimonial States**

*Imihigo* is the name of a performance contracting system between mayors and the President in Rwanda that is said to build upon traditional practices. This example shows the melding of political, planning and performance mechanisms within a developmental patrimonial state that though useful for evaluation has limitations.

In the *Imihigo system* Mayors are rated for their performance in achieving key development objectives related to the National Development Plan, with the rankings being released in the national press. There is a financial reward of Rwf 5 million and prestige associated with being the winning district (*Times* 2012). Accountability to the contracts takes place through biannual progress reports (*Versailles* 2013). In addition, *Imihigo* also has a variety of public input and feedback mechanisms, such as, accountability days, which involve some input from the public (*Vianney* 2011).

Poorly performing Mayors can expect public reprimanding if targets are not being met. The *Imihigo* system is perceived to have contributed to a high turnover in Mayors (75%) during initial implementation (*Scher* 2010). Performance contracts are verified through what are called evaluation processes, though these are more like audits that check accuracy of reports and then rank the districts against each other. These processes do not answer evaluative questions about the performance of mayors; rather they focus on what has been achieved (For example, MINALOC 2011). In previous years the *Imihigo* contracts did not directly articulate to the planning and budgeting processes. However, in an interview recently it was reported that these gaps had been recognised and that in 2013 there was an improved articulation between *Imihigo* contracts, plans and budgets.

*Imihigo* contracts are a potential entry-point for improving the uptake and use of evaluations, as they are an example of active demand for monitoring and provide a useful platform to transform evaluation findings into action. However, given the political economy, using them to undertake evaluations may reinforce the perception that evaluations are done when there are problems, thereby reducing the likelihood that evaluation will become broadly accepted as a tool for learning.

48) In neopatrimonial states, Ministries of Finance have weaker control over expenditure, with economic policy often spread-out over a range of ministries. In Malawi, economic policy is split between two central ministries and although line ministries provide financial reports to the Monitoring Section of the Ministry of Finance, some Ministries do not comply and it has not proven possible to impose any form of sanction with compliance is often waived due to political pressures (*Chirwa* 2004: 4). Similarly, Zambia, has drafted a new National Planning and Budgeting Policy given a long history of issues with controlling budget execution. This policy (*GoZ* 2013: 6), recognises that challenges have persisted across the previous decade in Financial management in Zambia. The policy states that there are:

...weak linkage between budgeting and development planning procedures; ambiguous and variable processes used in practice for preparing MTEFs, budgets and development plans; and no legally binding institutional structures in place to undertake budgeting and development planning procedures in a manner that ensures informed participation by relevant stakeholders and effective oversight by the National Assembly.
49) In particular the new draft policy notes that the credibility of the annual budget itself has been undermined for many years by wide in-year variations between appropriated amounts and actual expenditures incurred by ministries, provinces and other spending agencies. In Zambia, the challenges around the budgeting process are confirmed by Leiderer and Faust (2012: 167) who state that “in contrast to several of its counterparts in the region, the Zambian finance ministry is relatively weak politically and, as a consequence, has not been able to involve the sector ministries in an effective reform of public financial management.”

50) In neopatrimonial states national development plans, are in part facades to help garner external legitimacy with development partners, while real decision-making prioritises other strategies. In Ghana, for example, although a poverty reduction strategy paper was put in place President Kufuor launched Presidential special initiatives that served as real strategies of the state (Whitfield 2010).

51) Finally, in both Malawi and Zambia it is noted that sector-working groups often (with the expectation of the health sector) are often dysfunctional. The draft policy in Zambia, for example, notes that the “effectiveness of Sector Advisory Groups has been compromised by the perception that they are often donor-driven” (GoZ 2013: 10).

In summary (Table 5) the following issues are noted in relation to the political economy that emanate from in the review of the planning, budgeting, and M&E system.

Table 5: Planning, budgeting and M&E findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning budgeting and M&amp;E systems</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developmental patrimonial states are less open to outside interests, but have in place strong technocratic central ministries to oversee implementation.</td>
<td>Neopatrimonial states have weaker central ministries and technocratic controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and expenditure are broadly linked.</td>
<td>Expenditure is mediated through informal processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector working groups are functional</td>
<td>Sector working groups rarely represent genuine country-led planning forums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National development plans are statements of intent</td>
<td>National development plans are only partial statements of intent</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Mapping of Principals and Agents

52) This section presents some of the key findings of the country studies in relation to the research questions on evaluation supply and demand and supply. The key message arising from the mapping is that there is generally low actual demand for and supply of evaluation and little connection between them. However, in all countries there are some potential entry points to work with on both demand and supply. The purpose of the analysis in this section is not to recreate the country cases, but to highlight issues that arise within the different stakeholder groupings of principals, government agents and evaluation agents. It should be noted that as the analysis moves from supply to demand technical issues become more visible than political economy issues. The questions considered in this section are the following:

On the demand side,

i. What has been the actual demand for evaluation from principals? Where is there latent and potential demand for evaluation?

ii. How is evaluation demanded in the current organisational arrangements?

On the supply side and on matching evaluation supply and demand,

iii. What is the range and capacity of entities supplying evaluation services? How relevant are the managers and producers of evaluation to the actual demand for evaluation? Where can evaluation supply (actual, latent and potential) be strengthened so that it meets and fosters demand?

5.1 Demand

53) Analysis of the case studies reveals marked similarities between principals in developmental patrimonial and neopatrimonial states. The main differences appear within the legislature, where developmental patrimonial states use legislative procedures to support political strategies that keep corruption in check. The political economy of neopatrimonial states, in contrast, relies upon diffused rent seeking, and therefore does no prioritise control on corruption. Across the studies latent demand, not knowing that evaluation helps to answer some questions for evaluation is stronger than actual demand. This is significant in the Executive as latent demand provides an opportunity for ECD to develop some strong central champions. Very seldom in the studies is evaluation perceived as a source for evidence-based policy making by the government.

5.1.1 The Executive

54) The executive is the dominant branch of government in all of the case countries. For evidence to affect policy or implementation an entry point is required within the executive. The current demand for evaluation in all countries is more potential and latent rather than actual. Across the studies there is actual demand for monitoring and on occasions, in developmental patrimonial states, research rather than evaluation. A general exception appears to be in the health sector, where there is history and expertise in evaluation.

55) In developmental patrimonial states, although monitoring remains dominant, there is some openness to research being used in policy processes. In Rwanda, informants from government and civil society report that there is an active demand for using evidence and monitoring information to inform strategy within the executive. However,
if evidence is presented that is critical of a policy decision, especially on sensitive issues, then interviewees reported that the discussion might be rebuffed. This was reported to have happened in the education sector when an evaluation sought to establish the effects on school performance in relation to universal access for 9 to 12 years of basic education started to show negative results. As one respondent in Rwanda noted “as long as it is appropriately put and as long as the evidence is strong it will be accepted”. The general openness to evidence and monitoring information within the executive of Rwanda is not the same as an active demand for evaluation, which directly incorporates a variety of values.

56) In Ethiopia, demand within the political system is diffused and largely latent, embedded mostly within planning practices. There is limited information on the functioning of the Council of Ministers and the manner in which agendas are crafted. Engagement with performance matters within M&E reports are matters of internal sensitivity. Ministers’ appetite for evaluations is reflected in engagements with development partners. Development partners indicate that, when necessary, they are able to approach Ministers on the outcomes of evaluation studies and on the conclusions for policy that can be derived from the research. In such processes, there are indications that there is openness and interest goes beyond standard monitoring. The Government of Ethiopia recently established the position of State Minister for M&E within the Office of the Prime Minister. The role of this office has not been formally defined (or at least is not widely known) and speculations are that the office will serve as the formal channel for M&E reports on government ministries.

57) In the neopatrimonial states monitoring is the dominant form of performance assessment utilised by the executive. Although in Malawi and Ghana units with evaluative mandates under development. In Zambia, at the level of the executive there has been a demand for regular monitoring updates, rather than evaluation. In Malawi demand has been weak and inconsistent, in the case study this is argued to be as a result of a deeply rooted historical culture of patronage and fluid policies. On a positive note, the current government has taken steps to introduce a system of performance assessments where the definition and collection of indicators for monitoring will take a prominent role. The presidency is considering setting-up a central unit that will support performance in the state.

58) In contrast, within Ghana the executive arm of government has quite strong latent demand for evaluation. Over a number of years the Presidency has tried to establish units to monitor and support implementation. The Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit (PEOU), was recently replaced with a reconfigured Delivery Unit. The naming of the PEOU illustrates the confusion related to evaluation, as the unit’s actual mandate mainly focused on compliance monitoring. The demand of the current President for improved delivery is acting as a latent demand for evaluation, which some advisors are seeking to catalyse into actual demand.

5.1.2 Legislature

59) Across all legislatures the appetite and even the capacity to recognise the value of independent research and evaluation for the exercise of oversight is low. Evidence emerges from the cases that indicate that developmental patrimonial states undertake more serious oversight processes through audit reports than neopatrimonial states.

60) Within Rwanda and Ethiopia there is emerging demand for more information on government activities through audit reports especially on corruption issues. For example, in Rwanda parliament’s longest serving member currently heads the
Parliamentary Accounts Committee, which was created in April 2011. By November 2011, the committee is reported to have summoned 193 officials to explain issues that were highlighted in the Auditor Generals 2009/10 reports (Times 2011a). During committee hearings, they have a prosecutor present who may follow-up on misconduct charges. In interviews, it was reported that there are “No Closed Doors” to this committee. This approach has led to 294 prosecutions by the time of this study. The work of the accounts committee is conditioned as the executive mediates the oversight power of legislatures, with corruption being an important issue to control.

61) In neopatrimonial states the limited reach of Parliament’s oversight is reflected in their inability to follow-up on auditor general reports. In Ghana and Zambia there is specific evidence on the inability to curtail malfeasance. For example, in the transmittal letter included in the Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of District Assemblies for the financial year ended 31 December 2011, the Auditor-General wrote

\[ I \text{ had in my previous reports on the Management and utilisation of the District Assemblies Common Fund, recommended to the Honourable Minister of Local Government and Rural Development to set up effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to track actions to be taken on my conclusions and recommendations in my audit reports and management letters (…). I wish to reluctantly conclude that the increased and widespread instances of malfeasance and mismanagement of the finances and resources of the Assemblies by public officials as portrayed in my current report under review may be indicative that the Ministry has not significantly implemented the admonitions and recommendations in my previous reports. } \]

62) In Malawi the indications are that the Public Accounts Committee of the Assembly engages periodically with information presented by the audit process.

63) Development partners have attempted to support the strengthening of Parliament in all countries. Whilst there are indications of promising support to strengthen the role of legislature the overall constraints in institutional capacity remain pertinent. For example, in Rwanda there are no specialist staff attached to standing committees to equip them with the necessary technical expertise to perform effectively. There is one member of parliamentary staff per parliamentarian, below the African average of 1.62 staff per parliamentarian, while for Rwanda’s lower house (the Chamber of Deputies), the ratio of staff to MPs is less than one (0.77).

64) The potential of the legislature as intelligent users of evaluation is vast as they can conduct oversight of all areas of government, but ultimately mediated by the political economy. The development of entry points in this area would require the active engagement of parliamentarians and of the executive, given their wide-ranging powers.

5.1.3 Civil Society

65) Demand for evaluation from civil society and its use is complicated in the political economy configurations discussed in this study. In neopatrimonial states there are some channels for civil society to utilise the media for debate, although this space remains limited. Across all countries entry points in civil society could be identified generally amongst older civil society actors that have developed their legitimacy across different actors over time and resonate with political leadership in important ways.

66) In both developmental and neopatrimonial configurations civil society organisations that through their history have become legitimate within the political economy have success
in engaging with policy processes. In Malawi, Plan Malawi and WaterAid have roles in official structures. In Ethiopia, Action Aid Ethiopia (AAE) and Poverty Action Network of Ethiopia (PANE) have conducted research initiatives to feed into formal processes. In Zambia the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) is a research, education and advocacy organisation that promotes study and action on issues linked to Christian faith and social justice in Zambia. JCTR is an important research advocacy organisation, based upon their history and the prominent position of Christianity in the Zambian constitution.

Interestingly in Rwanda, one respondent noted that implementation processes can be influenced by civil society “when things come from the grassroots it is considered genuine. Especially when it can be discussed through traditional practices.” One example of this is research on the One Cow One Family Programme, which also interacts with the Ubudehe system (a process which classifies people into different poverty categories for the purposes of prioritising government services). The research that civil society conducted highlighted how membership of the scheme could mean that a family is categorised as not being poor, even though the family was unable to feed the cow. The openness to grassroots information in Rwanda may relate to particular orientation of the state to be seen to be supporting local traditional processes.

5.1.4 Development Partners

The five studies show that development partners (donors) dominate the actual implementation of evaluation studies. In interviews, evaluators conceded that most evaluations were commissioned and managed by development partners. Islands of evaluation practice have thus emerged in those sectors where donors focused their evaluations, such as health and education. It should be noted that some evaluations commissioned by development partners do align to country-led questions and that there are resources available for evaluation.

Across all studies interviewees reported that development partners dominate the actual implementation of evaluation studies. These reports are substantiated by the dearth of government evaluations, in comparison to the variety of development partner sponsored reports that can be located on various websites. However, the actual number of development partner evaluations is difficult to pin down as in no country was there a comprehensive library of evaluations that had been undertaken. For example, in the Malawi study it was reported there is no current repository for evaluations or analytical studies, which means there is no reference point to determine the coverage, quality and number of studies completed.

Development partner support has not been evenly spread across sectors; there is evidence that islands of evaluation practice have emerged in the health and education sectors. As previously cited Box 1: Evaluation feeding into Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) provides an example of long-term investments in the evaluative capacity of the health sector. Similarly Box 4 below also gives an example of a investment in the evaluative capacity of the health sector.

Box 4: Evaluation of Guinea Worm Eradication Programme in Ghana

Guinea worm disease is a parasitic disease transmitted to the host through drinking or coming into contact with water infected with water fleas. Work in the 1980s showed that there were about 180 000 cases per year of Guinea Worm Disease (GWD) in Ghana, ranking the country second in number of cases after Sudan. It takes about a year for the disease to
present itself after the parasite infects the victim. The disease manifests itself with a painful, burning sensation as the female worm forms a blister, usually on the lower limb.

Earlier reports indicate that because there are no drugs or vaccines to combat the disease, preventing transmission is the best means of elimination and control. Preventive measures include educating the community about the risks of allowing infected persons to enter sources of drinking water, such as open wells or ponds; building walls or other barriers around water sources to prevent entry; filtering drinking water through a nylon filament or something similar; providing safe sources of water supply, such as capped wells or catchments with pumps; and using chemical controls. The effect of the GWD included closure of schools in endemic communities due to large numbers of students being afflicted, farmers were unable to tend their fields, and families became further entrenched in dire poverty. Estimated losses in annual productivity in Africa ranged between US$300 million and US$1 trillion by the end of the 1980s. In Ghana, the disease became an important issue because it affected fertile lands and farm productivity. For example, it affected three of the highest yam production centres in the northern region of Ghana.

In response to the negative effects of the disease, many organisations including the Carter Centre, WHO, JICA and UNICEF collaborated with the Government of Ghana to establish the Ghana Guinea Worm Eradication (GWE) Programme. The key implementation strategies included (i) health education; (ii) use of filters; (iii) vector control; (iv) direct advocacy with water organisations; and (v) increased efforts to build safer hand-dug wells.

JICA conducted an evaluation of a GWE project which provided an opportunity to sharpen the evaluation skills of trained Ghanaian professionals. The Joint Project was evaluated in 2011 by a team including JICA consultants and Ghanaian professionals. The evaluation report showed that the GWD eradication programme was successful and the key contributory factors included community involvement, strengthening surveillance and alignment to national programmes. This evaluation contributed to the institutionalisation of M&E in health programs across the country as most of the funding from JICA was linked to districts having M&E units or personnel to monitor programme outcomes.

Furthermore, in 2009, JICA supported the establishment of a two-year programme to strengthen the M&E capacities of the Ministry of Finance and selected government entities. Two categories of officials were trained under the project. The basic group was trained in M&E while the core group was trained as trainers of trainees. Having completed their training, the core group members were assigned to conduct the ex-post evaluation of the GWE as technical cooperation by the JICA.

The purpose of the ex-post evaluation exercise was to sharpen the skills of the core group in the selected government entities. It is to be noted that the Terms of Reference of this evaluation stated that “the evaluation is part of a pilot exercise meant to enable the Core Team of the Strengthening the M&E Capacity of the Ministry of Finance and other MDAs [Ministries, Departments and Agencies] to conduct an ex-post evaluation of the Guinea Worm Eradication Project in Ghana”. The evaluation report was used for the certification of Ghana as a guinea worm-free zone. Although most of the M&E trainees do not currently work on M&E, the approach followed, combining training, study tour and opportunity for practice in conducting an actual evaluation, is a useful approach that with an appropriate selection of trainees could yield a higher benefit-cost ratio.

Source: JICA (2011)

71) Some evaluations undertaken with development partner resources do align to country-led practices. The studies show that it is too simplistic to consider development partner
demand for evaluation as narrowly focused upon their interests. On occasions, when
government takes an interest, development partner evaluations can lead to shifts in
implementation. For example, in Malawi government used recommendations from an
evaluation of the National Cash Transfer Programme that was commissioned and led
by development partners. In Rwanda, an influential randomised control trials (RCT) has
been completed in relation to performance financing in health (Basinga et al. 2011). In
both these cases there appears to have been an alignment of latent demands for
information on a policy issue of interest within the political configuration of the country.

72) In summary (Table 6), the commonality between the cases is striking. Although the
variances highlight that the different objectives held within the political economy frame
the boundaries of evaluation demand.

| Table 6: Demand |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Developmental   | Neopatrimonial  | Commonalities   |
| Patrimonial     |                 |                 |
| **Principals**  | Some demand for | Public accounts |
|                 | research        | committee has   |
|                 | Public accounts | limited ability  |
|                 | audit reports   | to affect change|
|                 | to limit        | based on audit  |
|                 | corruption      | reports         |
|                 |                 | Demand for evaluation is latent or |
|                 |                 | potential in the executive |
|                 |                 | There is a monitoring focus in the |
|                 |                 | executive       |
|                 |                 | General Interest in specialised units |
|                 |                 | placed in the executive supporting |
|                 |                 | evaluation      |
|                 |                 | Limited staff in parliament to support |
|                 |                 | research processes |
|                 |                 | Entry points for evaluation in civil |
|                 |                 | society could be identified amongst |
|                 |                 | older civil society actors that have |
|                 |                 | developed their political legitimacy |
|                 |                 | across different actors over time |
|                 |                 | Development partners dominate actual |
|                 |                 | implementation of evaluation |
|                 |                 | Development partner-led evaluation can |
|                 |                 | complement local demands |

5.2 Government Agents

73) Central Agencies (Ministries of Finance and Planning Commissions) are custodians of
formal policy intent and can be potentially powerful in the allocation of resources
according to evidence aligned to strategic intent. In reality the power of the central
agencies is mediated by the political economy. As discussed in Section 4.1
developmental patrimonial states tend have stronger central agencies that can
reallocate resources due to the centralised power structures. Meanwhile in
neopatrimonial states resource allocation is the result of informal policy processes,
which means that central agencies are institutionally weaker and less able to align
resources to strategic intent. For evaluation this means that demands for evaluation
from central agencies are likely to be more keenly felt in developmental patrimonial
states rather than neopatrimonial states.

74) In all countries the organisational arrangements for monitoring and evaluation are
articulated in the National Development Plans. These usually place a Central Agencies
as a coordinating agency. These arrangements have historically in the main focused
upon monitoring; especially the development of hierarchical monitoring systems that feed into annual progress reports, for example, the national development plans of Ghana and Zambia.

75) Weak organisational arrangements to manage evaluation across all cases are demonstrated by the lack of budget allocation. In Ghana, the NDPC (2011: 4) analysed M&E expenditure and reported that “monitoring activities accounts for approximately 63% of the total expenditure on M&E. This is followed by capacity building, 25%. Publication accounted for 6% while planning and evaluation accounted for only 3% respectively.” In some of the countries, like Ethiopia and Malawi, there are no budgetary provisions for evaluations. In Zambia there is budget for M&E, but it is not known how this money is actually spent. Also the quantities are quite low in individual activity-based budgets, meaning that even if the money was allocated it could not actually purchase a full evaluation unless several budget lines were put together.

76) In general, across case countries, the capacity to manage evaluations is generally limited in the central agencies as demonstrated by their lack of history in actually commissioning evaluations. Within the current organisational arrangement there are only limited examples of a central agency commissioning and managing evaluations. In Zambia, a range of evaluations were undertaken of the fifth national development plan. In Rwanda, evaluations have been commissioned through the Ministry of Finance. However, it was reported in Rwanda and Ethiopia the role of managing evaluation is often outsourced to development partners due to constraints within the departments.

77) In order to respond to and elicit potential and latent demand governments need to improve their evaluation management function. In developmental patrimonial states this could be accomplished within the Ministries of Finance given their strong technocratic role. Within Neopatrimonial states, which have weaker central ministries, the approach might identify assets in a central ministry but also work across the system, such as Ministries of Health.

78) Strong sector agencies are also undertaking the management of evaluations (as demonstrated by the examples in the previous section). The health sector across all countries was reported as a commissioner and user of evaluation. The reason for this appears to lie in the institutional architecture of the health system. The health sector has a history of evidence-based practice dating back over a 1000 years that is embedded in the training of health practitioners, controlled delivery environments, strong donor accountability mechanisms to reduce rent seeking opportunities and international norms and standards that are applied at the country level. This stands in contrast to the agricultural sector, which although having a good evidence-base, sits at a nexus of a variety of interest groups who can extract rents and works across multiple complex delivery environments (Birner and Resnick 2010).

In summary (Table 7) in the environment for managing demand for evaluations is conditioned by the political economy, having said this there are a range of commonalities between the case countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Agents</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong central ministries offer a focal point for ECD</td>
<td>Need to identify champions in both central and in line ministries (e.g.</td>
<td>Limited budgets for evaluation in government</td>
<td>Limited capacity to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Evaluation Agents’ Capacity and Links to Demand

79) In all countries there is potential supply rather than actual supply to manage, respond and elicit evaluation demand. As per the theory of change presented in this study this, which requires adequate supply, this is a major constraint on the use of evaluation. In analysis of supply and its links to evaluation management there are no apparent differences between the developmental and neopatrimonial states. This study identified islands of high-quality practice in specialised areas of a university or in think tanks.

80) Local supply in many instances is more configured for monitoring of policies, and even more of programmes and projects, for example annual progress reports. With a few exceptions evaluation teams are led by foreign consultants with limited participation of national consultants.

5.3.1 Universities

81) Universities in the case countries, in general, have limited evaluative research expertise. The table below shows the relative global positions of the lead Universities in the case countries, ranked according to published research output.23 This table not only represents the knowledge production challenges in case countries, with all main institutions in the countries study below 1300 in the global rankings.

82) Interestingly Table 8 shows total research output is inversely related to research impact. Normalised impact provides a measure of citation, with 1 being the global average, the more the score is above 1 the more it is being cited. This shows that whereas Addis Ababa University has the highest total output, its research has the least impact (citations). This means that it is producing more articles that are not cited by peers. While Zambia has the lowest output, but highest impact. This points a potential trade-off in ECD, in that pursuing research output potentially lowers the average quality of the output.

Table 8: University Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Africa Ranking</th>
<th>Global Ranking in Research Output</th>
<th>Normalised Impact24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa University</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ghana</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Malawi</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Zambia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 http://www.scimagoir.com/
24 Normalized Impact is computed using the methodology established by the Karolinska Intitutet in Sweden where it is named "Item oriented field normalized citation score average". The normalization of the citation values is done on an individual article level. The values (in %) show the relationship between an institution’s average scientific impact and the world average set to a score of 1, i.e. a NI score of 0.8 means the institution is cited 20% below world average and 1.3 means the institution is cited 30% above average
The capacity issues in universities are reinforced by the number of staff with PhD’s. In Rwanda, the National University of Rwanda around 25 per cent of the teaching staff have PhDs. In Zambia, out of 1024 university staff, only 255 (about 22%) have doctoral degrees (Kotecha et al. 2012). The University of Ghana is reported to be relatively well staffed, out of the 654 teaching and research staff, 412 of them (63%) has PhDs. These figures demonstrate the capacity constraints at the Universities, which mean that ambitious national development programmes do not have the in-country research support. These kinds of issues can only be resolved with decades of investment, which in turn can create new challenges. In Ethiopia a rapid expansion of higher education at Addis Ababa University, has rapidly expanded its Masters and PhD programmes. In 2010/11 there were over 9,500 enrolments for Master’s and nearly 1,300 for PhD. This rapid scaling-up comes with risks and the university has been struggling to find experienced local faculty to supervise PhD candidates. In addition, the few qualified faculty have to supervise more than 10 PhD students at a time which is likely to compromise the quality of supervision and research output.

However, in all five countries there is a social science capacity (sociologists, economists, political scientists) which could be mobilised for evaluation work linked to research. The Centre for Disease control is funding an M&E Centre of Excellence at the University of Zambia that could provide good returns especially if they are able to draw in other strengths of the University. In Rwanda and Zambia there is specific potential evaluation expertise in the health sector, which could be mobilised quite quickly. In Malawi the Department of Economics at the University of Malawi has a professional staff compliment of 11, with 9 at the PhD level. Given this reality, the academics are generally sought after for analytical and research work commissioned by development partners. The University of Malawi has a Centre for Agriculture Research and Development (CARD) based at the Bunda College of Agriculture. This research based institute has full time professional staff members who engage in monitoring and evaluation of agriculture and natural resource based projects. CARD has a smaller staff compliment than CSR: five professional staff of whom three have PhDs. CARD provides training on short courses on monitoring and evaluation, unlike the Department of Economics.

The University of Ghana has four research institutes or centres that conduct specialised research to feed into policy. These are the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER); the Nuguchi Memorial Medical Research Centre; Regional Institute for Population Studies and the Centre for Social Policy Studies. ISSER has specific expertise in conduct experimental and quasi-experimental designs. In partnership with the University of Carolina conducted an impact evaluation of the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty Programme (LEAP) in 2012, which led to a review of aspects of the LEAP programme. ISSER also evaluated the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Ghana in 2010.

A balance between expanding consultancy opportunities in evaluation and improved research output needs to be struck, however. In all countries it was reported that the research incentive is very low. In Zambia and Ethiopia it was reported that staff motivation is poor due to low salaries (about 300 USD per month for assistant professor/PhD holder in Ethiopia). Most University staff with PhD’s are engaged in various consultancy works with NGOs and development partners and do not have time and incentive for research. Consultancy is often a source of income, but does not require strong analytical capacity and is not publishable. For evaluation capacity to be developed graduates are required with good training in research methodology. Evaluations can help to sharpen methodology and generate knowledge, but can also undermine research and therefore long-term supply.
5.3.2 Think Tanks

87) Think tanks have received increasing funding in a number of case countries. New think tanks are emerging in Rwanda, Zambia, Ghana and Malawi. The relative strength of these Think Tanks appears to relate to their ability to work legitimately within the political economy. There are some examples of think tanks that are politically embedded which have helped shift latent demand to actual demand.

88) The African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) in Ghana is an economic policy institute that undertakes policy analysis, evidence-based advocacy and advice to African governments to enable them formulate and implement good policies and strengthen public institutions towards accelerated development. The Headquarters of ACET is based in Accra and has a core staff of 30 personnel from 8 African countries. ACET has undertaken analytical research in areas like foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows; export promotion policies and strategies; and education and skills development. In 2010 the AfDB engaged ACET to undertake analytical studies to generate evidence to guide the Bank in its efforts to promote economic integration among the 15 nations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

89) The Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) is one of two main Think Tanks in Rwanda it started its existence by undertaking a research process on major challenges facing sustainable peace in post-genocide Rwanda. IRDP is currently conducting research on barriers to the consolidation of peace in Rwanda namely, citizen participation, social cohesion and poverty reduction. IRDP report that they are engaging politicians at different levels in order to encourage ownership of findings. Within a recent report, IRDP commented on issues such as a culture of self-censorship, a control reflex, and challenges in communication between voters and elected representatives (IRDP 2011). Each of these issues could be considered highly sensitive within the political economy. Yet IRDP is reported to have good relations with government, for example, the Minister of Local Government, James Musoni “hailed IRDP for the initiative that promotes the country’s development” (Times 2011b). A 2011 evaluation of IRDP (Meijer and Bangwanubusa 2011: V) concluded that the:

“Programme continues to be of great strategic relevance for the prospects of peace building in Rwanda. It has succeeded in bringing into the open a number of highly sensitive and controversial issues, yet of crucial importance for the future of peace in the country; in the process, it has engaged a broad range of people in growing numbers, from youth in schools and universities and ordinary “people on the hills” to local authorities and the main decision-makers at national level.”

90) During interviews it was noted that although IRDP’s reports are not necessarily of the highest international quality, they appear to sufficiently resonate with Rwandan policy makers. One of their strengths appears to be their ability to strategically place themselves within the dialogue being undertaken by policy makers.

91) In Zambia, three think tanks were surveyed during the study the Zambia Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR), The Policy Monitoring and Research Centre (PMRC), and the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI). ZIPAR and PMRC were both originally set-up by rival political parties, ZIPAR (Movement for Multi-party Democracy - MMD) and PMRC (Patriotic Front - PF), while IAPRI are linked to the University of Michigan. Since the change of government, ZIPAR has lost government funding and has attempted to establish itself as an independent entity. Meanwhile PMRC, is fully funded by the government although claims to offer an
independent perspectives. Both ZIPAR and PMRC continue to have links to the state. ZIPAR’s are more grounded within the public sector bureaucracy, while PMRC has linked to senior public servants and politicians. With both being rooted in political parties their links to principals and government agents have meant that they have been able to raise the profile of some of the reports that they have generated.

92) The important point here is that, while think tanks are an entry point they may owe some of their policy influence and potential independence to their founders. This means that understanding their links to the political economy becomes important to understanding their potential for eliciting demand and developing evaluation capacity.

5.3.3 Evaluation Organisations and Networks

93) Across the case countries there are disconnects between evaluation supply and demand. In the case countries there is little evidence of substantive relationships between government and evaluation agents, except in some limited areas. This challenge is only now starting to be addressed through some more active voluntary organisations of professional evaluators.

94) Within the case countries there is a limited history of government and evaluation agents working together. In Zambia, evaluations of the national development plan have created links with the University of Zambia this relationship is new, however. In Rwanda there is a stated reticence by some senior public servants to work with local evaluators.

95) Evaluation focused organisations are now starting to emerge in the case countries. In Ghana there is an active monitoring and evaluation forum that has support from UNICEF. In Zambia two different organisations have recently merged to create one that is boundary spanning; these organisations have received support from GIZ and CDC previously. In Ethiopia there is a network of evaluators that have held meetings. In Rwanda and Malawi there is a lack of functioning networks. In spite of these advances forums still need to be developed that act as points of dissemination for research that brings government with the University sector. Support to sustained networking activity could help to develop trust between government, consultants and universities.

96) In summary (Table 9) the challenges facing supply in the region are a matter of degree rather than being essentially different. As the below Table shows there are no major issues of difference that relate directly to the technical delivery of supply. Mediating the technical delivery of evaluation supply in a manner that promotes use are the political issues that have been noted throughout this study.

### Table 9: Supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Agents’ capacity and links to demand</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade-offs need to be managed in increasing the capacity of the University sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some quality university expertise in economics, health and agriculture.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging number of think tanks with policy relevance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of embedded networks of evaluators that link to policy processes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
6 Political Economy Framework

97) The key conclusion emanating from this study is that the political economy conditions policy processes, within which evaluation supply and demand interact. It is suggested here that many demand and supply-side concerns are technical, yet because the overall policy space is political future rapid reviews with a political economy lens can help to highlight potential entry points for ECD. As can be seen from the analysis in this report moving from the overall political economy, through the policy landscape of planning and budgeting to demand and supply, the issues become more aligned in the technical delivery of evaluation. However, by dispensing with a political economy analysis the challenges in the use of evaluation in a policy process become more difficult to unpick. This section therefore presents an initial framework to aid the identification of ECD activities in the political logic of country stakeholders is explicit.

98) This framework draws upon the tables presented at the end of each section. Both characterisations of the political economy offer variable entry points for evaluation.

99) In neopatrimonial states it is difficult understand how informal forces will work in shaping policy processes, either decision-making or implementation. This means that policy processes that attempt to decrease poverty, such as subsidies, can instead be captured. Yet, it should be recognised that the existence of multiple competing interests does mean that there are possibly multiple potential users of evaluative evidence.

100) In developmental patrimonial states policy-making is centralised. This makes it difficult to influence policy directly through evidence as the processes happens within a narrow elite. However, as the state is legitimised through delivery of development, there is openness within technocratic state structures to evidence.

Table 10: Framework of Political Economy Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall structure of the state</th>
<th>Developmental Patrimonial</th>
<th>Neopatrimonial</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to central policy making structures. Centralised patronage structure that allows for strategic resource allocations. Influence on implementation is possible. Development partners have limited input into policy decisions.</td>
<td>Actual policy change is difficult to achieve, but interest groups can use evidence to their advantage to access resources.</td>
<td>Loyalty is aligned to elite interests rather than performance (although the two can overlap).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning budgeting and M&amp;E systems</td>
<td>Developmental patrimonial states are less open to debate, but have in place strong technocratic central ministries to oversee implementation. Budget and expenditure are broadly linked. Sector working groups are</td>
<td>Neopatrimonial states have weaker central ministries and technocratic controls. Expenditure is mediated through</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental Patrimonial</td>
<td>Neopatrimonial</td>
<td>Commonalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional. National development plans are statements of intent.</td>
<td>informal processes. Sector working groups rarely represent genuine country-led planning forums National development plans are only partial statement of intent.</td>
<td>Demand for evaluation is latent or potential in the executive. There is a monitoring focus in the executive. General Interest in specialised units placed in the executive supporting evaluation. Limited staff in parliament to support research processes. Entry points for evaluation in civil society could be identified amongst older civil society actors that have developed their political legitimacy across different actors over time. Development partners dominate actual implementation of evaluation. Development partner-led evaluation can complement local demands.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Principals**
Some demand for research Public accounts committee can use audit reports to limit corruption. Public accounts committee has limited ability to affect change based on audit reports. Demand for evaluation is latent or potential in the executive. There is a monitoring focus in the executive. General Interest in specialised units placed in the executive supporting evaluation. Limited staff in parliament to support research processes. Entry points for evaluation in civil society could be identified amongst older civil society actors that have developed their political legitimacy across different actors over time. Development partners dominate actual implementation of evaluation. Development partner-led evaluation can complement local demands.

**Government Agents**
Strong central ministries offer a focal point for ECD. Need to identify champions in both central and in line ministries (e.g. health). Limited budgets for evaluation in government. Limited capacity to manage evaluations in government.

**Evaluation Agents’ capacity and links to demand**
Trade-offs need to be managed in increasing the capacity of the university sector. Some quality university expertise in economics, health and agriculture. Emerging number of think tanks with policy relevance. Lack of embedded networks of evaluators that link to policy processes.

101) Table 10 lacks the nuance that is brought out in the individual country cases, but it does provide rules of thumb around challenges and opportunities for evaluation use in
different political settings. The table provides a starting point for asking questions about the political economy that can help to understand opportunities for evaluations in certain political settings. In developing evaluation capacity Table 10 provides a prior set of tests in engaging with principals and agents that helps to understand the entry points of change within policy processes.  

7 Conclusions

102) Although the Theory of Change presented in the Inception Report (and in the Section 2 of this report) proved useful in conducting the case studies, after completing the country studies it became clear that more emphasis should be given to the importance of the context, particularly the political economy. The following diagram and hypothesis now include explicitly the political dimension, which was placed as an implicit assumption in the Inception Report.

\[
\text{Political Economy} \rightarrow \text{DE & SE} \rightarrow \text{Use of evaluation}
\]

When there is an active demand for evaluation and evaluation supply that aligns with the conditions of the political economy, evaluations will be conducted and used.

103) Incentives for conducting and for using evaluations are shaped by the political economy, which in some countries, like Rwanda, leads to a strong demand for evidence (and consequently a latent demand for evaluations as sources of evidence), whereas in other countries, like Malawi, with a political culture of patronage based decision-making there are broader entry points.

104) Some attempts were made in the past to identify “champions” of ECD but with no success. However, the case studies identified entry points for ECD, an approach that is less risky than “picking champions” that may not perform as expected. Sector Working Groups, which are functional in representing country interests, could play a role in demanding evaluations and supporting evaluation management (or co-managed), emphasising both the accountability and the learning functions of evaluation.

105) In the five countries there are national M&E frameworks described by complex figures showing links among different government and non-government actors. However, these formal frameworks have been implemented to a very limited extent, in contrast to the development of actual national evaluation systems in South Africa, Uganda and Benin (as well as in Mexico, Colombia and Chile). A promising new development has been emerging with Offices of the President or Prime Minister with the exploration of them taking an active role in monitoring and evaluation, such as in the cases of Ghana, Ethiopia and Malawi. The extent to which these recently created Units and positions will actually function effectively to a great extent will be determined by politics.

106) Given the active role of donors in conducting and managing evaluations in the five countries it is worthwhile to explore ways in which development partners could involve national consultants (individuals and/or firms) in their evaluations to allow them to play significant roles both in conducting and in managing evaluations (complying with

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25 This table can be complemented with a set of ECD preliminary ratings for each of the countries (see Annex 5), based on the mapping, which provide baselines for future ECD work and for inter-country (and eventually inter-regional) comparisons.
commitments to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and subsequent ratifications) so as to create opportunities for learning by doing. Linking competent researchers to evaluations and evaluators, and providing them with training and/or orientations to conduct evaluations, will contribute to the development of evaluation capacities.

107) The discussion in this document on the cases is not comprehensive of the issues that were identified. Furthermore in-depth studies could be undertaken, for example, on the extent to which decentralised government structures are an entry point for evaluation in a given context. The initial patterns identified here in Ethiopia and Rwanda, demonstrates that a degree of political and implementation decentralisation is possible though it is held tightly in check. In Zambia and Malawi decentralisation processes appear to be underway, but are incomplete and politically mediated. In Ghana meanwhile some interviewees report that the decentralisation process has delegated real power, others contest this.

108) Further, this discussion gives little guidance on the trajectory of the states, instead it provides a snapshot of entry points that emerge in the current political reality. These entry points are likely to shift as is the political economy. Work on ECD needs to be alive to this as there is no single consensus on how political economies actually evolve. As the Malawi and Ghana cases show shifts in emphasis do happen.

On development partner influence, usefulness of evaluation and identification of entry points. Sometimes it has been argued that development partner influence may curtail the usefulness of evaluation. However, as the country case study of Rwanda shows, in a country that has strong ownership of its policies, this is a non-issue. In other countries, such as Zambia, the usefulness of evaluations would depend on the entry point(s), and the same applies to Ghana and Malawi. There are two possible responses to this. One is to suggest that there is no point investing in evaluation capacity development in countries lacking an enabling environment. Another is to use a political economy analysis to take identify appropriate entry points for evaluation. Furthermore, given the growing role of the private sector in Africa, in the case of foreign investment corporate social responsibility offers a promising entry point for evaluation. It may even open an effective way to influence government policy through the mobilisation of civil society voices.

109) On strengthening evaluation supply to meet and foster demand: Summing-up, the case studies show that in all countries there are opportunities to strengthen evaluation supply, with governments playing a more active role in demanding and managing evaluations. Think tanks and universities may enhance their capacities to conduct evaluations within research processes, whereas development partners can provide opportunities for learning by doing through functioning sector-working groups and by supporting processes that link to an area of concern where action is possible. Furthermore, sharing evaluation experiences among sub-Saharan African countries can strengthen local and regional evaluation networks, contributing to the development of regional evaluation capacities and to fostering demand for evaluation. This will contribute to making principals aware of the knowledge generated by evaluation and the possibilities of using that knowledge to improve policy making.
## Annex 1: List of Interviewed Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government agents</th>
<th>Evaluation Agents</th>
<th>Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Ethiopian Evaluation Association</td>
<td>Abt Associates (Health Care Financing Reform implementers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistics Agency</td>
<td>Faculty of Business and Economics of Addis Ababa University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)</td>
<td>Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER)-University of Ghana</td>
<td>Accountant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
<td>International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)</td>
<td>STAR-Ghana, a multi-donor pooled funding mechanism (funded by DFID, DANIDA, EU and USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Ghana M&amp;E Forum (GMEF)</td>
<td>Development Partners (DFID, World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Individual Evaluation Consultants</td>
<td>The Presidency (Senior Policy Advisor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Centre for Social Research</td>
<td>Parliament –Budget and Finance/Public Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Statistical Office</td>
<td>Centre for Agriculture Research and Development</td>
<td>Malawi Economic Justice Network, PLAN Malawi, Water Aid, Tilitonse Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economic Planning and Development</td>
<td>Private Consultants engaged in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Development Partners (DFID, Norwegian Embassy, African Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Economics Department</td>
<td>The Office of the President and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aids</td>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government agents</td>
<td>Evaluation Agents</td>
<td>Principals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td><strong>Commission</strong></td>
<td>Development Programme, UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Institute of Policy Analysis and Research – Rwanda (IPAR)</td>
<td>Parliament - Public Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda</td>
<td>Council for Higher Education (Universities)</td>
<td>Civil Society - the and the Civil Society Umbrella Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC)</td>
<td>Rwandan Consultants engaged in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Development Partners (DFID and SIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
<td>The Presidency and Prime Ministers office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation association</td>
<td>The United Nations Development, Programme Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Parliamentary research section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government and Housing</td>
<td>Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR); Policy Monitoring and Research Centre</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations – JCTR, NGOCC, CSPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistical Office</td>
<td>The University of Zambia – INESOR &amp; Population Studies Department Centre of Excellency for M&amp;E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Private Institutions and individual Consultants engaged in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Development Partners - GIZ; UNDP; AfDB; EU Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Evaluation Associations – ZEA and MESSY Group</td>
<td>The cabinet office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Stages of the Study Approach

1. **Stage one: Establishing support from key stakeholders:** Given the nature of the study, an important initial step in the study process is to secure a level of buy-in and commitment from relevant national stakeholders. Whilst the study was conducted independently, it is preferable that there is some level of active buy-in from key stakeholders in government and the evaluation community, because the study may have direct relevance for government departments or sections dealing with evaluations across the system. Prior to the study, there will be formal correspondence with key actors in government and outside. Key actors and stakeholders will also be engaged with to secure interest and active cooperation.

2. **Stage two: Collating and analysing secondary data and information:** The collation of and analysis of secondary data encompassed relevant information relating to the political context and the demand and supply side of evaluation. It included information on the policy processes and actors within the context; the legal frameworks and related documents pertinent to evaluation; data on the institutions active in evaluation, including data on size and scope of initiatives within government and the supply that emanates from outside of government. This initial analysis drew on evidence available on the Internet and in country documents that can be sourced by the researchers. Included in this stage was familiarisation with the country research teams on the study approach, especially in regards to the NEC matrix. The literature review included primary and secondary sources, collecting documents from sources in-country. Complementing this was an internet search. The following steps were taken in the review of literature.

On the demand side,
   a) What has been the actual demand for evaluation from principal agents?
      i. Review of national development policy/strategy
      ii. Review of budget priorities
      iii. Examples of nationally commissioned and completed evaluations
      iv. Evidence in media internet sources of use of evidence
      v. Identification of institutional commissions that utilise evidence in decision-making

   b) Where is there latent and potential demand for evaluation?
      i. Identification of legal mechanisms that support the demand for evaluation (e.g. constitution or committee structures in parliament)
      ii. Identification of political structures that can legitimately contest policy

   c) How is evaluation demanded in the current organisational arrangements?

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26 In conducting the literature review reference will be made to guidance on literature reviews, such as, Patricia Cronin, Frances Ryan, and Michael Coughlan, ‘Undertaking a Literature Review: A Step-by-Step Approach’, *British Journal of Nursing*, 17/1 (2008), 38 - 43.
3. **Stage three: Interviews with key informants:** In alignment with the literature review in stage two, a series of interviews were arranged with key in-country stakeholders. In each interview the purpose of the study was explained as part of the effort of securing buy-in on the value of the study. It is proposed that interviews be tailored to probe on gap in information related to the initial literature review. In particular issues of potential and latent demand and the ability of supply to invoke demand through its relevance demand are likely to need to be explored through the interview process due to limitations in documentation. In addition, filling out gaps in the cases will need to be achieved through the interview process (on occasions a focus group of 6 people or less could be undertaken e.g. with donor organisations.) The country literature review would serve to guide the initial approach at the national level. The data from interviews would need to be analysed after interviews with emerging conclusions refined as the study progresses.

4. **Stage four: Production of a draft and final country report:** After finalisation of the draft of the first two cases the three other cases were implemented with only internal reviews taking place. The lead researchers were the point persons for checking that the methodology and synthesis process met international standards. Meetings between members of the CLEAR-AA team will provided an opportunity
for checking on adherence to quality issues. Finally, the CLEAR-AA team prepared a synthesis (chapter 4 of this final report) that captures and considers the trends and contrasts emanating from the five country studies, and elicits insights – including adjustment of refinement of the prior conceptual map – towards conclusions.

5. The stakeholders interviewed in the study mirror those identified in the national evaluation capacity matrix and are closely linked to evaluation demand and supply. The interviewees in each of the countries included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Agents</th>
<th>Evaluation Agents</th>
<th>Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministries of Finance - 5</td>
<td>Think Tanks – 8</td>
<td>Executive – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Ministries – 9</td>
<td>University units – 6</td>
<td>Legislature – 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics Agencies - 5</td>
<td>VOPE’s - 5</td>
<td>Civil Society - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning departments – 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development Partners - 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 21</td>
<td>Total: 19</td>
<td>Total: 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: Definition of Actors in the Political Economy

Principals, play a leading role in the direction of the state through defining the parameters of the political economy and policy processes. In the main principals demand evaluation (although they can manage and conduct evaluations). The challenge for principals is that they need to manage agents who implement policy. Principals may have positional power, but they have limited levers of control. As a result evaluation can be important to them as it provides information on implementation. In demanding evaluation not only do principals have challenges overseeing government and evaluation agents, but because of asymmetries of information, they often do not know what these agents are meant to be doing (Stiglitz 2002). This framework differentiates between three different principals:27 Political leaders (executive and legislature), civil society, and development partners.

The Political executive/Legislature includes individuals and formations that are strategic in the policy construction and resource allocation process within the country. These include, Members of Cabinet level structures, Committees, and Ministers, senior policy advisors and political appointees who head departments. It may also incorporate structures within the political space that are closely tied to the political executives, such as party structures that shape policy choices prior to formal discussions within the Political Executive. Civil society includes organisations in this framework that are specifically geared towards influencing government policies and choices, and perhaps conducting evaluation for government. These may include civic organisations, business organisations, the media and trade unions. There are other civil society agents who deliver services; if they do not seek to influence policy then they are not principals. Development partners are organisations indirectly involved in government’s budget process and more directly in programme support. Depending on the political economy they may have a role in either or both policy and implementation. Historically in Africa much monitoring and evaluation practice has been driven by development partners (Abandoh-Sam et al. 2007; Ofir et al. 2012), although African led practice is now developing28. Many development partners are active in planning processes through sector working groups and may commission evaluations with government. Some of them may have provided technical assistance for evaluation capacity building.

Government Agents are entrusted “to act on behalf of those they are supposed to be serving” (Stiglitz 2002: 523). In doing this they manage institutions and policy processes. Often government agents need to weigh input from different principals both inside and outside the state. In their mediation and implementation processes they are able to develop knowledge on institutions and policy that allows them to

27 An earlier list included media, but because the studies did not engage with the media in the case countries they represent a potential role-player for further exploration.
influence implementation. From an evaluation perspective this means that they can intercede in demands for evaluation. This report focuses on the role of senior policy and implementation public servants. These are a group of individuals who are directly involved in shaping plans and implementation strategies in central and line departments. They are directly involved in the overall government-wide planning and evaluation process, and its use (e.g. Treasury).

Evaluation Agents undertake evaluations. Similar to government agents they have more knowledge than other role-players in their area of expertise. Where incentives are weak a lower standard of service might become the norm. By working together they may seek to develop learning, sharing and voluntary regulation mechanisms to improve practice. This study analysed three main sub-sets of agents: Think Tanks, Evaluation Associations, Consultants and Academic institutions. Think tanks are institutions created for ‘independent’ advice on policy and may include special university centres or institutions that have emerged to support a particular interest e.g. a ruling party or farmers. Evaluation Associations are often in the main made up of evaluators, which have undertaken evaluation either for government or development partners. The association can help to act as an intermediary between other agents and principals to help clarify issues around evaluation practice. Consultants often represent the main supply of evaluation expertise in countries and will have variable quality depending upon their training and the sophistication of demand they have responded to. Academic researchers often based in universities conduct evaluative research that has the potential to feed into policy discourse, either through routine mechanisms or occasional research.

It is recognised that the above list could be expanded. It is also acknowledged that in some contexts principals become agents and vice versa. The current list of principals and agents helps to produce a continuity of analysis across political, policy and evaluation interactions.

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30 For an interesting discussion on the art of forming lists see Eco and Mcewen, The Infinity of Lists.
Annex 4: Preliminary ratings for demand for and supply of evaluations in each of the five countries

For each of the country studies the teams rated the different dimensions of demand for and supply of evaluations using a four points rating scale. These ratings are initial and tentative and provide a summary of the mapping of demand and supply and, in addition, may also be used as a baseline for ECD in the 5 countries. Table 3 presents ratings for both demand and supply. The data for the ratings were generated by the teams that conducted the country case studies, applying the study conceptual framework to the information collected in the field.

Ratings corresponding to country demand for evaluation
Table 1 is limited to the demand for evaluation ratings. The highest ratings correspond to Rwanda, due to the interest in evidence to inform policy processes, even though there is only a partial realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence. Therefore, in Rwanda it is more latent, rather than an actual, demand for evaluation. The same type of analysis can be performed for the other 5 countries. These ratings provide a baseline and a way to synthesise the situation with respect to different dimensions of demand for and supply of evaluation in the five countries.

Table 1: Demand for evaluation country ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES:</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMAND FOR EVALUATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in evidence to inform policy processes (P)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in evidence to inform policy processes (G)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence (P)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence (G)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of funds to contract evaluations</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COUNTRY RATING FOR DEMAND</td>
<td><strong>2.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P: Principals  G: Government agents
E: Ethiopia  G: Ghana  M: Malawi  R: Rwanda  Z: Zambia
Scale:
1 Very limited; 2 Limited; 3 Present or Available; 4 Highly Present or Highly Available
Ratings for the supply of evaluations

Table 2 shows the ratings for the different dimensions of the supply of evaluations, including actual and potential capacity to supply evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES:</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLY OF EVALUATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Capacity (individual evaluators/organisations)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td><strong>2.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Capacity (individual evaluators/organisations)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td><strong>2.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Actual Capacity (G)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td><strong>2.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Potential Capacity (G)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COUNTRY RATING FOR SUPPLY</td>
<td><strong>2.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence (P) 2.3 1.3 2.0 2.5 1.5 **1.8**
Realisation that evaluation is a source of evidence (G) 3.0 2.3 2.0 3.0 2.5 **2.6**
Availability of funds to contract evaluations 3.3 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 **2.7**
AVERAGE COUNTRY RATING FOR DEMAND **2.7** **2.0** **1.8** **3.3** **2.1**

SUPPLY OF EVALUATION

Actual Capacity (individual evaluators/ organisations) 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.5 **2.1**
Potential Capacity (individual evaluators/organisations) 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 **2.6**
Management Actual Capacity (G) 2.0 1.8 1.0 2.5 2.0 **2.0**
Management Potential Capacity (G) 3.0 2.8 2.0 3.0 2.5 **2.8**
AVERAGE COUNTRY RATING FOR SUPPLY **2.7** **2.2** **1.8** **2.4** **2.5**

AVERAGE COMBINED COUNTRY RATING **2.7** **2.1** **1.8** **2.9** **2.3**

P: Principals  G: Government agents
E: Ethiopia  G: Ghana  M: Malawi  R: Rwanda  Z: Zambia

1 Very limited; 2 Limited; 3 Present or Available; 4 Highly Present or Highly Available

*Source: country case studies*
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